TY - GEN
T1 - Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
AU - Babichenko, Yakov
AU - Rubinstein, Aviad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 ACM.
PY - 2017/6/19
Y1 - 2017/6/19
N2 - For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1 - ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.
AB - For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1 - ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.
KW - Approximate nash equilibria
KW - Communication complexity
KW - Convergence rate
KW - Uncoupled dynamics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85024361817&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3055399.3055407
DO - 10.1145/3055399.3055407
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AN - SCOPUS:85024361817
T3 - Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
SP - 878
EP - 889
BT - STOC 2017 - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
A2 - McKenzie, Pierre
A2 - King, Valerie
A2 - Hatami, Hamed
T2 - 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017
Y2 - 19 June 2017 through 23 June 2017
ER -