TY - GEN

T1 - Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

AU - Babichenko, Yakov

AU - Rubinstein, Aviad

N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 ACM.

PY - 2017/6/19

Y1 - 2017/6/19

N2 - For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1 - ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

AB - For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1 - ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

KW - Approximate nash equilibria

KW - Communication complexity

KW - Convergence rate

KW - Uncoupled dynamics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85024361817&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1145/3055399.3055407

DO - 10.1145/3055399.3055407

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AN - SCOPUS:85024361817

T3 - Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

SP - 878

EP - 889

BT - STOC 2017 - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing

A2 - McKenzie, Pierre

A2 - King, Valerie

A2 - Hatami, Hamed

T2 - 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017

Y2 - 19 June 2017 through 23 June 2017

ER -