TY - GEN
T1 - Communication complexity of nash equilibrium in potential games (extended abstract)
AU - Babichenko, Yakov
AU - Rubinstein, Aviad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires text{poly}(N) communication in two-player N times N potential games, and 2{text{poly}(n)} communication in n-player two-action games. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results to demonstrate hardness in any model of (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games.
AB - We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games. In particular, we show that finding a Nash equilibrium requires text{poly}(N) communication in two-player N times N potential games, and 2{text{poly}(n)} communication in n-player two-action games. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results to demonstrate hardness in any model of (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in potential games.
KW - Computation theory
KW - Game theory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099816474&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/FOCS46700.2020.00137
DO - 10.1109/FOCS46700.2020.00137
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AN - SCOPUS:85099816474
T3 - Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS
SP - 1439
EP - 1445
BT - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2020
T2 - 61st IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2020
Y2 - 16 November 2020 through 19 November 2020
ER -