Abstract
This paper addresses a "game" between an inspection agency and multiple inspectees that are subject to random inspections by that agency. We provide explicit (easily computable) expressions for all possible Nash equilibria and verify that none is left out. In particular, our results characterize situations when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We also explore special features of the Nash equilibria and the solution of the problem the inspection agency faces in a non-strategic environment.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 422-430 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | European Journal of Operational Research |
Volume | 215 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Dec 2011 |
Keywords
- Game theory
- Inspection games
- Nash equilibria
- Resource allocation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Computer Science
- Modeling and Simulation
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Information Systems and Management