Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game

Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany, Uriel G. Rothblum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper addresses a "game" between an inspection agency and multiple inspectees that are subject to random inspections by that agency. We provide explicit (easily computable) expressions for all possible Nash equilibria and verify that none is left out. In particular, our results characterize situations when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We also explore special features of the Nash equilibria and the solution of the problem the inspection agency faces in a non-strategic environment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)422-430
Number of pages9
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume215
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2011

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Inspection games
  • Nash equilibria
  • Resource allocation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Information Systems and Management

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