TY - GEN
T1 - Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests
AU - Babichenko, Yakov
AU - Dean, Oren
AU - Tennenholtz, Moshe
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 ACM.
PY - 2020/7/13
Y1 - 2020/7/13
N2 - Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic selection mechanismis a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is incentive-compatible(IC), if the probability assigned to a vertex does not change when we alter its outgoing edge (or even remove it). The quality of a selection mechanism is the worst-case ratio between the expected progeny under the mechanism's distribution and the maximal progeny in the forest. In this paper we prove an upper bound of 4/5 and a lower bound of 1/łn16 ∼0.36 for the quality of any IC selection mechanism. The lower bound is achieved by two novel mechanisms and is a significant improvement to the results of Babichenko et al. (WWW '18). The first, simpler mechanism, has the nice feature of generating distributions which are fair (i.e., monotone and proportional). The downside of this mechanism is that it is not exact (i.e., the probabilities might sum-up to less than 1). Our second, more involved mechanism, is exact but not fair. We also prove an impossibility for an IC mechanism that is both exact and fair and has a positive quality.
AB - Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic selection mechanismis a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is incentive-compatible(IC), if the probability assigned to a vertex does not change when we alter its outgoing edge (or even remove it). The quality of a selection mechanism is the worst-case ratio between the expected progeny under the mechanism's distribution and the maximal progeny in the forest. In this paper we prove an upper bound of 4/5 and a lower bound of 1/łn16 ∼0.36 for the quality of any IC selection mechanism. The lower bound is achieved by two novel mechanisms and is a significant improvement to the results of Babichenko et al. (WWW '18). The first, simpler mechanism, has the nice feature of generating distributions which are fair (i.e., monotone and proportional). The downside of this mechanism is that it is not exact (i.e., the probabilities might sum-up to less than 1). Our second, more involved mechanism, is exact but not fair. We also prove an impossibility for an IC mechanism that is both exact and fair and has a positive quality.
KW - incentive compatibility
KW - selection mechanisms
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089276280&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3391403.3399456
DO - 10.1145/3391403.3399456
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AN - SCOPUS:85089276280
T3 - EC 2020 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
SP - 111
EP - 131
BT - EC 2020 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
T2 - 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2020
Y2 - 13 July 2020 through 17 July 2020
ER -