SATISFICING, META- REASONING, AND THE RATIONALITY OF FURTHER DELIBERATION

Rakefet Ackerman, Igor Douven, Shira Elqayam, Kinneret Teodorescu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

David Over has made seminal contributions to the study of human rationality, most memorably in the now-classic distinction, made in collaboration with Jonathan Evans, between normative and instrumental rationality. In this chapter, we discuss an under-explored aspect born of the tension between the two: the rationality of searching for further choice options. We review several candidates for a model of further deliberation, including classic Bayesian decision theory, bounded rationality, and the research domain concerned with the “secretary problem.” We demonstrate how none of these can satisfy the twin adequacy criteria calling for an account of processing as well as an account of rationality. We then present a model based on a proposal made in Douven (2002) and the psychological model of meta-reasoning. We conclude with implications for human rationality.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLogic and Uncertainty in the Human Mind
Subtitle of host publicationA Tribute to David E. Over
Pages10-26
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781351620420
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Psychology

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