Spatial Voting with Incomplete Voter Information

Aviram Imber, Jonas Israel, Markus Brill, Hadas Shachnai, Benny Kimelfeld

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review


We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean d-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location of voters' ideal points is incomplete: for each dimension, we are given an interval of possible values. We study the computational complexity of finding the possible and necessary winners for positional scoring rules. Our results show that we retain tractable cases of the classic model where voters have partial-order preferences. Moreover, we show that there are positional scoring rules under which the possible-winner problem is intractable for partial orders, but tractable in the one-dimensional spatial setting. We also consider approval voting in this setting. We show that for up to two dimensions, the necessary-winner problem is tractable, while the possible-winner problem is hard for any number of dimensions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)9790-9797
Number of pages8
JournalProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Issue number9
StatePublished - 25 Mar 2024
Event38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2024 - Vancouver, Canada
Duration: 20 Feb 202427 Feb 2024

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence


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