TY - CHAP
T1 - The Logic of Backward Induction
AU - Arieli, I.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd. All rights reserved.
PY - 2023/12/1
Y1 - 2023/12/1
N2 - Call a perfect information (PI) game simple if each player moves just once. Call a player rational if he never takes an action while believing, with probability 1, that a different action would yield him a higher payoff. Using syntactic logic, we show that an outcome of a simple PI game is consistent with common strong belief of rationality iff it is a backward induction outcome. The result also applies to general PI games in which a player's agents act independently, rendering forward inferences invalid.
AB - Call a perfect information (PI) game simple if each player moves just once. Call a player rational if he never takes an action while believing, with probability 1, that a different action would yield him a higher payoff. Using syntactic logic, we show that an outcome of a simple PI game is consistent with common strong belief of rationality iff it is a backward induction outcome. The result also applies to general PI games in which a player's agents act independently, rendering forward inferences invalid.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85181920061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1142/9789811227332_0012
DO - 10.1142/9789811227332_0012
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AN - SCOPUS:85181920061
T3 - World Scientific Series in Economic Theory
SP - 287
EP - 321
BT - World Scientific Series in Economic Theory
A2 - Aumann, Robert J
ER -