Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Yakov Babichenko; Aviad Rubinstein

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein

Data and Decision Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp⁡(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	376-398
Number of pages	23
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	134
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005
State	Published - Jul 2022

Keywords

Approximate Nash equilibria
Communication complexity
Convergence rate of uncoupled dynamics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005

Cite this

@article{32a61c064d2940259fb1327baa1b743f,

title = "Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria",

abstract = "For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp⁡(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.",

keywords = "Approximate Nash equilibria, Communication complexity, Convergence rate of uncoupled dynamics",

author = "Yakov Babichenko and Aviad Rubinstein",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier Inc.",

year = "2022",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "134",

pages = "376--398",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

AU - Babichenko, Yakov

AU - Rubinstein, Aviad

PY - 2022/7

Y1 - 2022/7

N2 - For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp⁡(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

AB - For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp⁡(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

KW - Approximate Nash equilibria

KW - Communication complexity

KW - Convergence rate of uncoupled dynamics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089517696&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.005

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:85089517696

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 134

SP - 376

EP - 398

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this