TY - JOUR
T1 - Information aggregation in large collective purchases
AU - Arieli, Itai
AU - Koren, Moran
AU - Smorodinsky, Rann
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and the good is supplied whenever total contributions exceed a threshold. We study the case where the good is excludable, agents have a common value, and each agent receives a private signal about the common value. We study how such collective decisions perform in terms of information aggregation, social efficiency, and market traction.
AB - Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and the good is supplied whenever total contributions exceed a threshold. We study the case where the good is excludable, agents have a common value, and each agent receives a private signal about the common value. We study how such collective decisions perform in terms of information aggregation, social efficiency, and market traction.
KW - Crowdfunding
KW - Information aggregation
KW - Public good
KW - Threshold
KW - Voting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85171191278&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00199-023-01525-w
DO - 10.1007/s00199-023-01525-w
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AN - SCOPUS:85171191278
SN - 0938-2259
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
ER -