Mediated Cheap Talk Design

Itai Arieli; Ivan Geffner; Moshe Tennenholtz

Mediated Cheap Talk Design

Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz

Data and Decision Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers data from the senders and recommends the receiver which action to play. We characterize the set of implementable action distributions that can be obtained in equilibrium, and provide an O(n log n) algorithm (where n is the number of states) that computes the optimal equilibrium for the senders. Additionally, we show that the optimal equilibrium for the receiver can be obtained by a simple revelation mechanism.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	AAAI-23 Technical Tracks 5
Editors	Brian Williams, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Neville
Pages	5456-5463
Number of pages	8
ISBN (Electronic)	9781577358800
State	Published - 27 Jun 2023
Event	37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 - Washington, United States Duration: 7 Feb 2023 → 14 Feb 2023

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023
Volume	37

Conference

Conference	37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023
Country/Territory	United States
City	Washington
Period	7/02/23 → 14/02/23

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

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title = "Mediated Cheap Talk Design",

abstract = "We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers data from the senders and recommends the receiver which action to play. We characterize the set of implementable action distributions that can be obtained in equilibrium, and provide an O(n log n) algorithm (where n is the number of states) that computes the optimal equilibrium for the senders. Additionally, we show that the optimal equilibrium for the receiver can be obtained by a simple revelation mechanism.",

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Mediated Cheap Talk Design. / Arieli, Itai; Geffner, Ivan; Tennenholtz, Moshe.
AAAI-23 Technical Tracks 5. ed. / Brian Williams; Yiling Chen; Jennifer Neville. 2023. p. 5456-5463 (Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023; Vol. 37).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Mediated Cheap Talk Design

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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