TY - GEN
T1 - Private circuits II
T2 - 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2006
AU - Ishai, Yuval
AU - Prabhakaran, Manoj
AU - Sahai, Amit
AU - Wagner, David
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Motivated by the problem of protecting cryptographic hardware, we continue the investigation of private circuits initiated in [16]. In this work, our aim is to construct circuits that should protect the secrecy of their internal state against an adversary who may modify the values of an unbounded number of wires, anywhere in the circuit. In contrast, all previous works on protecting cryptographic hardware relied on an assumption that some portion of the circuit must remain completely free from tampering. We obtain the first feasibility results for such private circuits. Our main result is an efficient transformation of a circuit C, realizing an arbitrary (reactive) functionality, into a private circuit C′ realizing the same functionality. The transformed circuit can successfully detect any serious tampering and erase all data in the memory. In terms of the information available to the adversary, even in the presence of an unbounded number of adaptive wire faults, the circuit C′ emulates a black-box access to C.
AB - Motivated by the problem of protecting cryptographic hardware, we continue the investigation of private circuits initiated in [16]. In this work, our aim is to construct circuits that should protect the secrecy of their internal state against an adversary who may modify the values of an unbounded number of wires, anywhere in the circuit. In contrast, all previous works on protecting cryptographic hardware relied on an assumption that some portion of the circuit must remain completely free from tampering. We obtain the first feasibility results for such private circuits. Our main result is an efficient transformation of a circuit C, realizing an arbitrary (reactive) functionality, into a private circuit C′ realizing the same functionality. The transformed circuit can successfully detect any serious tampering and erase all data in the memory. In terms of the information available to the adversary, even in the presence of an unbounded number of adaptive wire faults, the circuit C′ emulates a black-box access to C.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33746066725&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/11761679_19
DO - 10.1007/11761679_19
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AN - SCOPUS:33746066725
SN - 3540345469
SN - 9783540345466
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 308
EP - 327
BT - Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006 - 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
Y2 - 28 May 2006 through 1 June 2006
ER -