TY - CHAP
T1 - Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage
AU - Bogdanov, Andrej
AU - Ishai, Yuval
AU - Srinivasan, Akshayaram
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, International Association for Cryptologic Research.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against (formula presented) leakage and similar low-complexity classes. In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against (formula presented) leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against(formula presented) leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012).
AB - We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against (formula presented) leakage and similar low-complexity classes. In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against (formula presented) leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against(formula presented) leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85071517520&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_14
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_14
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SN - 978-3-030-26950-0
SN - 9783030269500
VL - 11693
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 387
EP - 416
BT - ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - CRYPTO 2019, PT II
A2 - Boldyreva, Alexandra
A2 - Micciancio, Daniele
T2 - 39th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2019
Y2 - 18 August 2019 through 22 August 2019
ER -